In this light one may ask, 'Has the rise of American political science come to its end? Will there be some kind of decline or will American political science return to a new ascendancy?' These are crucial questions not only for the development of political science worldwide, but also for an understanding of present and future politics. A decline in esteem for American political science may indicate a decline in the US position in the world, or even the coming of a new era where the role of political science will be quite different from what it is today. In this sense an analysis of the development of American political science is of the utmost importance.
In an earlier article (Berndtson, 1983 ) I argued that there are four phases of development in American political science, which can be labelled by using the concept of democracy: 1. the formation of representative democracy (1880 to 1920); 2. the emergence of the problems of representative democracy (1900 to 1940); 3. pluralist democracy as a solution to the problems of democracy (1920 to 1965); 4. the crisis of pluralist democracy (1945 to the present).
To envisage these phases as beginning in 1880 is somewhat artificial, as the formation of both representative democracy and political science was underway some time before 1880 (in relation to political science, see Haddow, 1939) . However, 1880 has been taken as a starting-point because the first academic institution of political science, the School of Political Science, was founded that year at Columbia University. Because the school was created mainly through the efforts of John W. Burgess, he is often considered to be the founder of the discipline.
The four phases outline real historical development and reflect the alleged changes in the study of politics that can be discerned in political-science texts. If there is one shared feature in the texts of such classic or influential scholars as John W. Burgess, Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Charles E. Merriam, Harold D. Lasswell, David Easton, Robert A. Dahl, TheodoreJ. Lowi, etc., it is a common theme which centers around the concept of power -or its different forms such as 'sovereignty', 'authority', 'influence', 'administration', or 'decision-making'. In each case a concept of power is further conceptually linked with a form of social organization, in this case a system of democracy.
The phases therefore represent theoretical frameworks and basic concepts of political science which can be discerned through the 'reading' of the texts (see Berndtson, 1983 : 90-94). The overlapping of phases, however, shows that every phase contains not only a prophecy of what is to come, but an analysis of the past. In this sense the phases must be understood as 'analytical'.
Interpreting political science as a science of democracy is of course nothing new. This is one of the major theses of David Ricci in The Tragedy of Political Science (1984), and the same idea has been presented not only by critics of the present state of political science (e.g. Lipsitz, 1972: 179) , but also by those who have wanted to turn political science into the science of democracy (e.g. Lasswell, 1942) . I have tried to argue that this 'permanent condition of political science' is reflected in the specific 'theoretical objects' which political science has produced in different periods of its development.
In this sense, the first phase is a period where the state was considered as the politically organized form of society, the form defined through the concept of sovereignty. Political scientists concentrated on problems of the state: government and its functions were studied from philosophical, historical and judicial angles with an eye to developing democracy.
In the second phase, the study of politics began to change. The development was quite logical: the state as a political organization of society became a meta-group of society. From the study of the functions of the state one moved into the study of behavior and the political struggle of citizens and groups. Historical and comparative analysis was changed into statistical, psychology-based empirical research, the concept of sovereignty changed into the concept of power, and demands for liberty and freedom were transformed into an analysis of the functioning of representative democracy.
In the third phase, political science came to be centered around the problems of stability of political systems, political socialization and legitimacy. The concept of the state diminished to that of a government which operated in the political system. Power as a central concept of political science was fragmented and perceived in terms of authority and influence. This was also an era of the 'behavioral study of politics' with a strong emphasis on quantification, measurement, theory construction and value-free research.
The fourth phase seems to represent a diversified discipline, with its mainstream and critical currents; but in the background, there is still a question of democracy. Analyses of the functions of the state, demands about the relevance of research, polemics about the right method in research, all reveal attempts to create a new theory of democracy and even a new society. In a way we are back to the problems of the first phase. There is a new interest in the question of'right' political organization of society.
Used in that way the concept of democracy partly explains the view of political science as 'in many ways a peculiarly American discipline' (Friedrich, 1947: 978) . Political science began to develop in the United States partly because the system of democracy was far more advanced in the United States in the 19th century that it was in Europe.
The development of American political science can and must be analyzed along with other strategies. Actually, behind the theoretical reconstruction presented above, was the 'ordinary' sociology of science approach. It would have been impossible to reconstruct the phases without knowing about the institutionalization and development of American political science as well as the development of American society. The next task is to move back into history to look at how these theoretical objects have risen from the discursive practices of political science. By that I mean that political theory is in most cases produced in social practices, where the .practical needs and social practices of politicians, administrators, industrialists and political scientists intermingle. I am attempting such a task in this article to evaluate the present state and future possibilities of the discipline, and I am utilizing three main arguments:
1. the goals of practical politics have had a strong influence on the development of American political science; 2. the study of politics, politics itself, and different material interests in society (e.g. the economy) have been intertwined in so many ways that they comprise an inseparable unity; and 3. this unity contains mechanisms which bring certain scholars to the surface while burying others. A closer look at the alleged German roots of the discipline reveals not only German roots but a sharp conflict between the German Staatslehre and Anglo-Saxon political thinking of that time, which was to mold the theoretical object of the first phase of American political science. The conflict was clearer at the political level, even within Columbia University. Burgess came to be identified as the pre-eminent representative of German ideas and protagonist for the American-German alliance in world politics (Burgess, 1904 (Burgess, , 1908 ). At Columbia his major opponent in that respect was William A. Dunning (Dunning, 1914 ). Burgess's leanings towards the idea of German Staatslehre led him into a bitter quarrel with Frank J. Goodnow, his colleague at Columbia and the first president of the American Political Science Association (Karl, 1974: 35) .
The most Anglo-Saxon oriented American university at that time was probably Harvard. Its president (a political scientist), A. Lawrence Lowell, 'imported' leading English political scientists to the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. His personal acquaintance with such scholars as James Bryce and Graham Wallas was also marked by political considerations. They had a joint interest in defending Anglo-Saxon civilization against German 'barbarism'.
Many other leading political scientists followed the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Woodrow Wilson wrote Congressional Government (1885) to argue for the necessity of reforming US political institutions according to models offered by the English political system. Wilson's authority was Walter Bagehot, and his criticism of American political science chose the Anglo-Saxon tradition and stayed with it. Berlin was forgotten, but although London was attractive politically, it was not attractive scientifically. The trend away from German studies is illustrated in Table 1 by figures concerning the book reviews published in Political Science Quarterly between 1886 and 1925. Instead, American political science began to look at the problems of the United States. Universities had developed, certain political problems had been solved, the ties with Germany had been cut, and there was no need to look at England either. The practical concerns had changed.
William A. Dunning could write in 1907:
So far as concerns speculation that is chiefly juristic there is a priori ground for the correctness of the tentative generalization, for where the goal has been definitely reached in the progress toward constitutional democracy, as is the case in Great Britain, France and the United States, reflection on what is gives way naturally to reflection on how it came to be so; while among peoples whose constitutional problems are still in a considerable degree unsettled, discussion will turn on those questions of sovereignty, rights and ideal organization which are the core of systematic political theory (Dunning, 1907: 693) .
To this Charles C. Williamson could only add:
Although the controversy as to the best form of government seems now to be settled in favor of representative democracy, students and statesmen everywhere, and particularly in the countries which have had most experience with it, are disappointed with its results. This partial failure of popular institutions to justify themselves demands a political inquiry more fundamental than our present minute study of political history or the widespread discussion of recent experiments in representative institutions (Williamson, 1909: 696 American and British political sciences were in different situations which led to different kinds of interests concerning politics and its study. This was another factor in favor of the development of political science in America rather than, for instance, in England. The theories and research strategies of these men spread throughout the world, partially through the International Political Science Association which was founded in 1949. Its first president, Quincy Wright, was a model product of the Chicago School. The demands of the international situation came to direct the interests of many political scientists in this phase, although, of course, the demands of internal politics in the United States continued to have an important effect on the development of political science. But whereas the second phase had been interested in concrete social and political problems, the third phase was more interested in questions of legitimacy (Berndtson, 1979) .
Chicago
In regard to the international situation, at least some American political scientists were quite aware of their task. In the book published by Unesco describing the state of political science around the world in 1950, Benjamin E. Lippincott wrote about the tasks of political science in the following way:
Regarding the conflict between communism and western democracy, political theory-has an important task to fulfill. It has, in the first place, to bring to bear the wisdom of Machiavelli, and the experience of mankind with autocracy of the past; it has to bring home to the western mind the realities of power politics in the twentieth century. It has, in the second place, to reappraise the ideological heritage of the eighteenth century, the emphasis on good will and reason, the values that made possible Yalta and the failure to establish a geographical corridor between Berlin and western Germany. It has, in the third place to provide an analysis of freedom and political change, which is superior to the Marxian. This analysis must not only be based on a more profound view of man's nature, and a dynamic conception of history, but it must also be expressed in language that appeals to the conscience, as well as to the intelligence, of men throughout the world (Lippincott, 1950 
Political Science as an American Discourse on Politics
The preceding historical sketch attempted to put forward a view of the close relationship between political science and actual politics. Is there some special discourse on politics within American political science and peculiar to American political science? David Ricci has talked about a triangle of scholarship, democracy and politics, where expertise is crucial (Ricci, 1984) . In much the same vein, Bernard Crick has discussed the linkage of science, citizenship training, American democracy and trust in an inevitable progress, a manifest destiny for American society (Crick, 1959) . These ideas give a certain American flavor to political science. As both Crick and Ricci have argued, the emphasis on science is peculiar to American political science and linked to the rise of American universities, which occurred at the same time as political science began to develop (Ricci, 1984) .
Political scientists wanted to become authorities on politics, and a special discourse on politics was born which tried to separate itself from other discourses. Political science had scientific authority, which raised it above politicians, newspapermen, artists, writers and administrators, who each had their own ways of understanding and analyzing politics. Political science was considered to be a discourse on these different discourses. I want to emphasize two special effects of that discourse: neutrality, and industry-like 'processing', both linked to the notion of political science as the science.
Woodrow Wilson once told his audience:
Such a commission would be in fact a commission to discover, amidst our present economic chaos, a common interest, so that we legislate for the whole country instead of for this, that, or the other interest, one by one. Students of political science are a self-constituted commission in the broader political life for a similar purpose. They must discover, amidst the confusion of modern elements, the common term, the common interest -or, rather, they must discover the missing term (Wilson, 1911: 6-7).
According to the ideology of neutrality, nobody is guilty until proved guilty. An example is the discussion between elitists and pluralists. Criticizing elite theories, one of Robert A. Dahl's arguments was that nobody had provided empirical evidence that any elite (defined as a group of people) had exerted a clear influence on the outcome of a body of important decisions. Because nobody had been able to do that, there was no evidence that a ruling elite existed (Dahl, 1958 Periodizations of the development of American political science usually look at methods, for example, the formal, the traditional, the behavioral and the post-behavioral stages (Easton, 1985) , or at the present state of the discipline in terms of formative years, the emergent period, the middle years and the contemporary period (Somit and Tanenhaus, 1967; see also Ricci, 1984) . These kinds of periodizations reveal either a faith in science (Crick, 1959) or a reading of history through the present in an effort to make the present legitimate. The periodization of this article tries to link the development with a major concern of the discipline, democracy. All these periodizations may be valid, but they certainly give different pictures of the development. These differences would support Derrida's argument that we never have enough authority to insist on one interpretation rather than another, that all we can do is give counter-examples to accepted explanations in order to illustrate with more and more such examples the ultimate untenability of these explanations (see Skinner, 1985 Lasswell, 1951) . With these multiple explanations, I have tried to make the picture more complex than it would be with a single explanation. Many histories could be written on the development of American political science. The story would be different from either the Harvard or the Chicago perspective. I have tried, however, to emphasize the accidental, and the complexity of the situation whenever one is hard put to identify specific influences that would show the continuity of some basic ideas or the logic of some development.
The There has been a certain continuity in ideas. Whether ideas are considered right or wrong depends on the situation and the status of those presenting them. For instance, in the 1950s, Hans J. Morgenthau (see Morgenthau, 1955 ) and, at the beginning of the 1960s, Leo Strauss and others (see Storing, 1962 ) criticized behavioralism in much the same way as became fashionable in the post-behavioral revolution. In their own time they were noticed, but treated more or less as curiosities.
In spite of all the complexity and unpredictability, I would argue that it is a legitimate task to try to reconstruct the theoretical objects of a discipline, and that it is legitimate to look at those discursive practices which have moulded the theoretical objects.
The Fall of American Political Science?
The rise of American political science coincided with the rise of the American role as a superpower in the world. It also coincided with the growth of representative democracy. The logical conclusion seems to be that the development of political science as we understand it is dependent on the future of representative democracy. The role of American political science, on the other hand, is dependent on internal and external changes affecting the United States. The internal contradictions in the present state of American political science may also be interpreted as reflections of those transformations which are molding American society today, for example, the move from the Midwest, the birthplace of political science, to the South and the Southwest. These social changes prompt other crucial questions. The role of the political scientist has clearly changed. In the first phase an educator, in the second he became a political advisor whose role, in the third phase, was more and more that of a general vehicle of legitimation. In the fourth phase, a crisis looms in a new situation where there seems to be no role for political scientists, unless they can create a new one.
One thing seems certain: society has become more diversified and it is no longer possible to envisage the kind of centers in political science that existed at Columbia and Chicago. Perhaps that means that political science will also become even more diversified than it is today. Diversification is a strong trend in American political science as political scientists identify themselves as, among other things, women, black or gay political scientists. That may be a good thing in the future. General theories are always attempts to gain power, either in society or in scientific discourse. Political struggle which concentrates on specific points needs different kinds of knowledge and a different kind of intellectual. Perhaps it will lead us to a situation where there is no American or European or Asian or African political science, but instead different political discourses depending on locality, situation and politics.
